CPLR 4213(c): Section Deemed Precatory by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 42 
Number 1 Volume 42, July 1967, Number 1 Article 38 
April 2013 
CPLR 4213(c): Section Deemed Precatory 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1967) "CPLR 4213(c): Section Deemed Precatory," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 42 : 
No. 1 , Article 38. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol42/iss1/38 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
1967] NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE 155
Since neither case presented an "identity of issues," the ques-
tion of the effect of Cummings on the Glaser rule would seem to
remain unresolved.
ARTICLE 42- TRIAL BY THE COURT
CPLR 4213(c): Section deemed precatory.
In Allied Scrap & Salvage Corp. v. State,"0 3 the defendant
moved to vacate an award on the ground that the decision was
not rendered within sixty days after the cause was finally sub-
mitted, as provided for in CPLR 4213(c). The court, however,
noted that the provision of CPA § 442,104 providing for a new
trial if the decision were not rendered within sixty days, was
deleted from CPLR 4213(c) "because under the old rule courts
customarily denied the new trial on condition that the decision be
rendered within an additional specified time." ' This deletion,
the court surmised, made CPLR 4213(c) precatory.
Two arguments are advanced for the proposition that 4213
inust be precatory: (1) there is no method of enforcement; and
(2) assuming a means of enforcement, a judge forced to render a
decision will be prone to decide against the moving party. Both
arguments may be answered.
With respect to enforcement, the duty of a judge to render
an opinion is unquestionably a ministerial one. It would seem,
therefore, that a writ of mandamus could issue against a judge
who failed to render a decision within the sixty days provided
for in 4213.106 The court in Allied did not discount such a course
of action. As to the second argument, a decision which smacks
of abuse of discretion can always be appealed.
Thus, it would seem that there is still logical justification for
an interpretation of CPLR 4213 which would find that provision
more than a pious wish.
10326 App. Div. 2d 880, 274 N.Y.S.2d 317 (3d Dep't 1966).
104 Under CPA § 442, a court trying a case without a jury had to render
its decision "wvithin sixty days after the final adjournment of the term where
the issue was tried." Upon failure of the court to do so, either party could
move for a new trial and the court would be obliged to order a new trial
absolutely or order a new trial conditionally upon a decision not being
rendered within a specified time. In practice the section was merely preca-
tory, since the motion for new trial was rarely granted and, instead, the
time for the court's decision was generally extended. 4 WEINSTEIN, KORN
& MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 14213.11 (1966).
10 Allied Scrap & Salvage Corp. v. State, 26 App. Div. 2d 880, 274
N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (3d Dep't 1966).
106 "[Mandamus] is a proper remedy to compel the performance of a
specific act where the act is ministerial in its character. . . ." 2 BOUVIER,
LAW DICTIONARY 2075 (9th ed. 1914). Seemingly, under CPLR 4213 the
duty would not be subject to mandamus until the sixty days had passed.
